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Abstract: This project reflects on the ambivalence of the EU member states in their relationships 
with the new institutional arm of European diplomacy – the European External Action Service, 
headed by the High Representative. While trapped in rhetorical support for stronger and 
better-coordinated EU foreign policy, the member states show little willingness to equip the 
newcomer with political mandate and room for action, and provide a case in point for the post-
Maastricht integration paradox. The main aim of this paper is to shed light on the reasons for 
this paradoxical behaviour. Taking into consideration the timeline 2009−2014, the article looks 
at patterns and dynamics of the mutual cooperation between the EEAS selected member states 
(Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom).
Keywords: European External Action Service, member states, power struggle, the new 
intergovernmentalism.
Introduction
The emergence of Europe as a political actor on the international stage consistently attracts 
the interest of diverse groups of scholars. After the changes introduced by the Treaty 
of Lisbon regarding the further institutionalisation of the EU foreign policy, this trend 
has become even more intense. No wonder, since the challenges the EU is confronted 
with comprise a long list – the Ukraine crisis, a troubled relationship with Russia, the 
turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, the rise of Islamic State and the refugee 
crisis, are just present-day examples. When the financial crisis was handled, foreign policy 
was elevated to the top of the European agenda. At this particularly inconvenient time, 
as renationalisation tendencies have reemerged across several member states2, the post-
Lisbon foreign policy framework was put to the test.
1 The author is very grateful to the referees for their helpful comments and wishes to acknowledge 
the financialsupport of the National Research Council for this publication (along the project decision: 
DEC-2013/09/B/HS5/01356).
2 Balfour, Carta and Raik 2015, 194−196.
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For several decades, there has been broad agreement amongst the majority of scholars 
that the development of the European actorness, defined as a tried-and-tested capability 
to join forces against issues of the highest stakes, should be perceived as a longer-
term project. However, there are diﬀerent approaches as to how best to interpret the 
improvements of the last two decades in terms of increased resource availability and the 
growing numbers of instruments at the disposal of the EU, which have facilitated the 
deployment of over 30 civilian and military missions in diﬀerent world regions. Some 
scholars still emphasise the continuous resistance of the member states to the development 
of a truly common foreign policy due to the lack of political will and divergent interests.3 
Whilst others draw particular attention to the move beyond intergovernmentalism as the 
execution of foreign policy no longer being a purely national aﬀair and that European 
institutions foster a common voice on foreign matters.4Concurrently, an increased 
demand for common external action among the EU states can be expected in the future. 
Facing the most current foreign policy challenges (as in the EU’s neighbourhood both in 
the East and in the South), individual member states are de facto powerless bystanders. 
This functional pressure, together with the support of 66 percent of European citizens 
for a more collective approach towards external challenges from the Union,5 and the 
slow but consistent progression of the institutionalisation of this policy field, exert causal 
influence towards the further development of the EU’s capabilities to act eﬀectively in the 
international arena.
Considering such factors, this article focuses on the latest changes within the institutional 
framework of EU foreign policy that were introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon – the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) headed by the new-look High Representative for Foreign 
Aﬀairs and Security Policy (HR). The establishment of the new Service and its relevance to 
EU foreign and security policy-making has enjoyed growing scholarly attention in recent 
years. There is no straightforward method on how to set up a conceptual framework for 
interpreting the establishment of the new Service and its relevance to EU foreign and security 
policy-making. One strand of research focuses on the EEAS as a bureaucracy and treats it 
mainly as a tool for enhanced administrative cooperation.6 Other scholars investigate the 
new diplomacy in terms of further expanding EU foreign capacities due to the leadership 
of the new Service and its impact on agenda setting within various foreign policy related 
areas.7 There are also a remarkable number of publications that tend to downplay the role 
of both the new Service and the HR by highlighting their limited role and restrained power.8 
Despite the diﬀering views on the latest institutional engineering, there is an agreement 
that, after amendments are brought in by the Treaty of Lisbon, capabilities and operational 
3  See i.e. Helwig 2013; Putter 2012; Toje 2008; Mayer 2013; Putter 2014.
4  See i.e. Howorth 2011; Sjursen 2011; Bicchi 2012; Adler-Nissen 2014.
5 Eurobarometer 2015, T71. 
6  See: i.e. Erkelens and Blockmans 2012; Henökl and Trondal, 2013.
7  See: i.e. Hemra, Raines and Whitman, 2011; Balfour, Bailes and Kenna, 2012.
8  See: i.e. Edwards 2012, 63−67; Janning 2014. 
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background are no longer prime factors constraining the Union’s foreign policy, but they 
have not yet turned it into a credible international actor.
This statement constitutes the point of departure for this paper. The analysis targets 
the observation that, notwithstanding the clearly diﬃcult circumstances of the EEAS 
inception (i.e. immediate challenges in the European Neighbourhood right after the 
establishment of the Service, the on-going financial crisis, the turf wars with the European 
Commission and other foreign policy stakeholders over the division of responsibilities), 
the essential influence on the performance of the new Service is wielded by national 
capitals. The member states will, for the foreseeable future, remain in the driver’s seat 
of the policymaking process within the field of European foreign and security. Thus, 
the success of the newcomer is only possible with the active backing of its creators. 
The EEAS depends on recognition by national governments, since it draws upon and 
combines their resources. We face a dilemma: the national leaders were the ones who 
decided to establish the diplomatic arm of the EU, yet they are also the gatekeepers who 
approach it with anxiety and try to limit its functionality. The rhetorical support for a 
stronger, better coordinated European foreign policy, declared by a great majority of the 
member states, is not backed up with a willingness to accept the risks and costs that 
this would entail. This phenomenon corresponds with the post-Maastricht integration 
paradox defined by Uwe Puetter in the context of the EU economic governance. While 
policy interdependencies have grown, member states have resisted the further transfer 
of formal competences to the EU level, and are aiming for greater policy coherence by 
intensified intergovernmental coordination through the European Central Bank and the 
new European Stability Mechanism.9 In the case of EU foreign policy, member states, 
instead of transferring further competences to the European Commission, have decided 
to establish the EEAS as a body that, to a great extent, represents their interests and 
therefore diﬀers from traditional supranational institutions.
Considering the timeframe between 2009 and 2014, this article follows the question-
driven approach and focuses on the relationships between the member states and the 
EEAS by investigating the reasons for the limited willingness of national capitals to give 
the new actor a space in which to perform. It looks at both the attitudes of the member 
states towards the newcomer, and the policy content, i.e. the counter-strategies adopted 
by the national capitals to hinder the diplomatic innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
and the cooperation patterns between national diplomacies and the EEAS over high 
stake political issues. The article is founded on empirical research, including a series of 
interviews with foreign policy elites from Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, and 
proven experts in this field,10 as well as on the analysis of oﬃcial documents of the three 
9 Puetter 2012,161.
10  In order to maintain the anonymity of the interviewer, the author presents only the positions 
of the interlocutors and the data of the interview. The full list of interviewers is in the possession of 
the author. 
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governments towards the cooperation with the new Service and their ideas on the role of 
the EEAS and existing literature.
Following an introductory section on the general background and challenges for the 
relationship between the member states and the EEAS, this paper successively examines 
particular case studies and dynamics of the mutual cooperation between the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Poland, and the newcomer. The conclusion summarises the 
empirical findings from the three countries, and comes up with a few general remarks 
about the obstacles for the cooperation between the EEAS and the member states, and the 
resulting consequences for EU foreign and security policies.
Methodological dilemma of studying the relationship between the EEAS and 
the member states
The investigation of the relationship between the new European diplomacy and the 
member states is a challenging exercise. Not only is the framework of European 
external relations unique, with its attempt to bring coherence into the still predominant 
intergovernmental decision-making process and supranational elements of the policies, 
but the sui generis nature of the EEAS brings another challenge. The newcomer, who was 
initially supposed to be the European Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs when first discussed 
during the Convention on the Future of Europe 2001−2003, became, after many years 
of power struggle and inter-institutional bargaining, a body of its own kind. The Treaty 
does not formally recognise the new Service as an institution, even thoug hit de facto 
possesses the required criteria of an institution, such as structure, legal address, staﬀ, 
budget and objectives, which is why several scholars treat it as one, regardless of the 
Treaty’s stance.11 Yet, despite all the diﬃculties with the establishment of the new Service, 
the “organisational merger of the lower levels of day-to-day administrative work in EU 
external action”12 was claimed to have a “high potential for creating synergetic eﬀects.”13 
Catherine Ashton, the first HR after the Treaty of Lisbon, called it “a once-in-a-generation 
opportunity to build something that finally brings together all the instruments of our 
engagement in support of a single political strategy”.14 After almost five years since the 
Service started, European foreign policy is still far away from being truly common and 
coherent and there is a blame-game going on over who is responsible– the member states 
or the External Action Service, or other foreign policy stakeholders at EU level.
The idea of this paper is to go beyond the blame-game and to focus on the relationship 
between the EEAS and the member states. Despite the fact that they were the crucial part 
of the agency behind the creation of the new Service, they “found themselves with a new 
11  See: Bátora 2010, 2; Bátora 2011, 6; Barton and Quinn 2011, 5.
12  Gebhard 2011, 123.
13 Ibid.
14  Ashton 2010. 
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European External Action Service and did not know what to do with it”.15 The rationale 
behind the idea for European diplomacy was the notion that it is high time to move 
beyond existing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) machinery without losing 
the intergovernmental character of the EU foreign and security policies. Furthermore, 
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty was supposed to push the member states, 
irrespective of their diﬀerent interests, towards a more integrated and coherent approach 
in regard to external action, and towards division of labour and burden-sharing between 
them and the other stakeholders of EU´s foreign policy. Yet, the national leaders failed 
to define the exact role and scope of the new diplomacy in the Treaty of Lisbon, leaving 
much room for further inter-institutional negotiations over the its political role, staﬃng, 
positioning amongst other European institutions and, most importantly, over the division 
of competences between the new body and the other foreign policy stakeholders.16 A 
compromise between national interests over the new Brussels diplomacy (providing 
leadership and overall coordination without stepping on the toes of national Foreign 
Ministries) as well as over the preferences of the European Commission (staying away 
from crucial external portfolios such as neighbourhood policy and the budgetary 
control over the whole external action) and the European Parliament (being a channel 
of enhanced influence over EU foreign policy for the Parliament) has to be found.17 The 
Council decision of 26 July 2010,18 which established the organisation and functioning 
role of the EEAS, underlines its supportive character towards, not only the HR in all its 
triple-hatted mandate (conducting the CFSP, chairing the Foreign Aﬀairs Council and 
acting as a Vice-President of the Commission), but also the President of the Commission 
and of the Council – all together, “mission impossible”.19
On the whole, the relevance of the EEAS, perceived by key stakeholders such as the EU 
member states, should not be taken for granted. While all member states have endorsed 
the Lisbon Treaty, some governments (for example the British Conservative-Liberal 
government) have a hard time understanding (or accepting) the implications of what the 
member states, including Great Britain, have ratified.20 Emerson and his team go even 
further in the judgement of the situation by claiming that “some EU member states seem to 
have been conducting a reargued action to minimize the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty.”21
So far there are no recognized models in the area of foreign relations which could have 
been used to study the dynamics between the member states and the European Diplomatic 
15  Balfour, Raik 2013, 11.
16 For more on how the logic of diversity between the member states left a strong mark on the 
negotiation process, see: Lequesne 2015, 6.
17  For a comprehensive analysis of the interests of each stakeholder towards the EEAS see: Le-
quesne 2015, 3−6.
18 Council Decision 2010.
19 Balfour and Raik 2013, 13.
20 Jörgenson 2015, 40.
21 Emerson et al. 2011, 2.
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Service. However, there are two strands of research which might constitute a point of 
departure for this paper. On the one hand, so far there is only one comprehensive analysis 
of the relationship between the EEAS and the national diplomacies edited by Balfour, 
Carta and Raik.22 Their underlying assumptions that the new European diplomacy can be 
examined as a cause of change in national foreign services, alongside national, regional 
and global dynamics. Thus, their analytical framework is based on the Europeanisation 
approach and its three mechanisms – downloading(national adaptation to rules from the 
EU level), uploading(projection of national preferences) and cross loading (the process of 
socialisation). The country case studies within the volume primarily focus on changes in 
national structures, resources and priorities of the national diplomacies, and investigates 
the links between these processes and the EEAS. In contrast with the examination of 
the adjustment of the national foreign policy structures, this paper focuses more on the 
mutual interplay between the European and national diplomacies and its limitations and, 
therefore, the Europeanisation approach does not seem suitable in this instance.
The second, theoretical approach for studying the relationship between the member 
states and the EEAS is oﬀered by new intergovernmentalism framework.23 Drawing on the 
integration paradox – EU countries pursue more integration but stubbornly resist further 
supranationalism,24 the new intergovernmentalism implies the post-Maastricht tendency 
to delegate power to de novo bodies rather than traditional supranational institutions. 
The European External Action Service is an example of such a de novo body. However 
the operationalisation of this approach (six hypotheses outlined by the authors of this 
theory) enables one to prove the arrival of the new intergovernmentalism in the current 
state of the European integration by looking at recent developments in various policy 
areas.25 Since this paper takes the existing institutional framework in EU foreign policy as 
a starting point and goes beyond it by investigating the dynamics of the interplay between 
the de novo institution –the EEAS and the member states, this approach is not directly 
applicable here.
Having the predominant aim of the paper in mind, which is to contribute to shedding 
light on the under-explored relationships between the EEAS and the selected member 
states, and not to follow a particular theory or to formulate a systematic methodological 
framework (which could seen as the next step to the analysis), it will follow a question-
oriented approach. By applying this approach, the article is able to reveal a more complex 
picture of the relationship between the newcomer and the national foreign oﬃces’.26 It 
also brings a more detailed focus on to the existing and potential areas of cooperation, 
as well as the limitations and obstacles in the relationship. Rather than focusing on a 
22 Balfour, Carta and Raik,eds. 2015. 
23 Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015.
24 Puetter 2012, 168.
25 Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a.
26 Fierke and Jorgensen 2015; Griﬃths 2007.
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narrow theoretical framework or method, question-driven research more generally allows 
scholars to uncover complex and multifaceted puzzles.
Germany, Poland, Great Britain towards the EEAS
In the following section the patterns of cooperation and the bilateral dynamic between 
Germany, Poland as well as Great Britain and the European External Action Service will be 
examined. There are several reasons for the selection of the three particular countries. All 
three have heavy-duty objectives in terms of their external interests and influence on the 
European agenda, therefore it could be assumed that they all display a level of resistance 
against yielding competences to Brussels. Obviously, while the aspirations, scope and 
capabilities of British and German diplomacy clearly outweigh the Polish one, Warsaw 
still remains an ambitious foreign policy player, in particular towards Eastern Europe. 
However, at the same time, they have diﬀerent approaches to European integration 
and its external dimension. The UK credits superiority to its own national policy and 
understands the EU as one of many international organisations, which can be leveraged as 
a tool to pursue British foreign policy interests. This attitude combined with weak support 
for European integration in general, makes London a rival to any strong role of new policy 
actors at EU level. In contrast, Germany, mainly for historical reasons, identifies to a high 
degree with the idea of Europe and with a common foreign policy and, as examples from 
the past have shown, it would more likely transfer further competences in this area to the 
EU level.27 Moreover, the financial crisis embraced the position of Berlin in Europe which, 
combined with the role of ‘reluctant hegemon’, makes it a thought-provoking case study. 
Poland, as a thus far been a constantly Euro-enthusiastic new member state, has strong 
national interests in the development of the common foreign and security position of 
the EU, also because of its exposed geographical position to, and historically motivated 
fear of, Russia. Having no independent foreign policy of its own - being a state within 
the Soviet sphere of influence – Poland has spent the past thirty years creating national 
foreign policy from scratch. Therefore, there are political groups who oppose the transfer 
of the recently gained accession to European level. This choice of countries allows the 
presentation of the multidimensional aspects of the relationship between the External 
Action Service and the national capitals.
Here is it worth mentioning a related point. One important aspect of the relationship 
between the EEAS and the member states is reflected in the role of the EU Council rotating 
presidency which used to be an important channel for national capitals to influence the 
European foreign policy. The launch of the redefined role of the HR and the EEAS resulted 
in major limitations to the competences of the rotating presidency with regard to the 
management of the administrative procedures and to the agenda-setting both in Brussels 
and in third countries.28The previous European Commission’s delegations outside Europe, 
27 Möller and Rappold, 2012.
28  For more see i.e. Emerson 2011, 37−52; Sus 2015, 99−117.
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which overnight became the EU delegations under the auspices of the EEAS, took over 
the role of coordination and representation of the EU position via-a-vis the third country. 
The experiences of the post-Lisbon presidencies indicate that, after a transition period, 
the cooperation between the rotating presidencies and the EEAS both in Brussels and on 
the ground works fairly well. Since the examination of the performance of the successive 
Council presidencies enjoys attention of scholars, it will not be elaborated on further 
within this paper.29
Drawing on existing literature regarding the EEAS’s relations with other stakeholders of 
EU foreign policy and following the problem-driven approach, the paper puts forward an 
analysis of the relationship between the national diplomacy and the diplomacy at the EU 
level respectively, which lies on three issues:
?? patterns of cooperation and potential functions that the country credits to the EEAS,
?? channels that the national foreign services use in order to upload their foreign policy 
preferences
?? obstacles and limitations in their mutual relationships.
These three aspects shall bring some light to the relations between the new European 
diplomacy and the member states, and may contribute to a more systematic examination 
of the interplay.
Germany
For Germany, being the strongest European economy and a country with one of the 
biggest diplomatic networks in the world, the EEAS plays a supplementary role. Having 
said that, it is not surprising that Berlin is perceived as one of the biggest supporters of the 
new foreign policy actor in Brussels.30 In particular, in comparison to the defiant United 
Kingdom and an ambiguous France, experts perceive Germany as willing to transfer 
further competences in foreign policy to the European level.31The motivation of Berlin 
to support the Service is twofold. First of all, Germany endorses the External Action 
Service for upgrading its external power where it was limited i.e. as representation of 
the EU in a number of multilateral forums such as the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, and negotiations with Iran. Secondly, European diplomacy is a suitable channel 
through which Berlin can enhance the legitimisation of its national foreign policy without 
being accused of dominating the EU agenda. Since the unification of Germany in 1990, 
German politicians from diﬀerent parties have often repeated the same statement: “We 
29  See i.e. The JCMS Annual Review of the European Union, in which the assessments of the EU 
Council presidencies are published on regular basis. 
30 Lieb and Maurer 2008.
31 Lehne 2013. 
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want a European Germany, not a German Europe”.32 Over 25 years later, after a huge 
transformation in terms of the enhancement of the European project and in changes in 
Germany itself, the sentence seems to still be valid to some extent. As the recent financial 
crisis has proven, there are still traces of fear of an overly strong Germany amongst some 
Europeans.33 For this reason, Berlin pays close attention to the execution of its foreign 
policy aims through the European framework and with the support of European partners. 
As Frank-Walter Steinmeier said in 2015“there can be no German foreign policy without 
European foreign policy”.34 According to Wolfgang Ischinger, an experienced German 
diplomat, Berlin should put its full weight behind the Brussels bades leadership in EU 
foreign policy, in order to achieve its two key objectives: a stronger and more capable EU 
and a more European Germany.35 Thus as Berlin felt dissatisfied with the current role and 
performance of the newcomer, it has presented numerous proposals with suggestions for 
improvement. Along with other EU countries such as Poland, the German government 
did not rule out the possibility of equipping the High Representative and its Service 
with more power and competences. For instance, shortly before the Polish EU Council 
Presidency, the two countries, along with France, initiated the ‘Weimar letter’ on the 
enhancement of military cooperation. The process is to be run under the auspices of the 
EEAS.36 Furthermore, Berlin was one of the leaders of both letters from the national foreign 
ministers on how to improve the functioning of EU foreign policy – in December 201137 
and in September 2012.38However, as Balfour and Raik noted “despite reassurances that 
these eﬀorts are supposed to be constructive, in Brussels these initiatives are perceived 
to mine the ground on which the HR/VP and the EEAS are standing”.39Aside from the 
letters, German Foreign Ministry started before the EEAS review in 2013 consultations 
towards the strengthening of the Service by renegotiating its division of labour with the 
European Commission and by handing over the power of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and external assistance.40Moreover, German oﬃcials claim there is a readiness to 
32  The sentence was originally said by Thomas Mann in 1947 and quoted in i.e. Genscher 2010. 
33 Schäuble 2013; Blomeet al. 2015.
34 Steinmeier 2015. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2015/150225-
BM_Review_Abschlussveranstaltung.html?nn=699270
35 Ischinger 2015.
36  EU Council on CSDP, 2010. 
37  Joint letter from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden to the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Aﬀairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, 
Catherine Ashton, 8 December 2011. 
38  Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, 17 Septem-
ber 2012.
39 Balfour and Raik 2013, 21.
40  Interview with an oﬃcial from the German Ministry for Foreign Aﬀairs, July 2015. 
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support the majority voting in CFSP, which could make the coordination task for the HR 
and EEAS much easier.41
With regard to the channels of communication, German oﬃcials claimed that there 
are two main methods they use in order to promote certain foreign policy ideas to EU 
level. The quite obvious one is the agenda of the Foreign Aﬀairs Council which should 
be consulted with the member states before every meeting. The second one is oﬀered by 
German oﬃcials working for the EEAS headquarters in Brussels, or for the EU delegations 
on the ground. Berlin succeeded in promoting Helga Schmid, the former director of 
Policy Planning of the High Representative in the General Secretariat of the Council to 
the Deputy Secretary General for the EEAS, and continues to support its personnel in 
applying for the open positions in Brussels.42
Apart from the generally supportive attitude of Germany towards the EEAS, the Ukraine 
crisis clearly showed limitations in this respect. The negotiations of the Association 
Agreement with Kiev, as well as the preparations for the summit in Vilna in November 
2013,were primarily coordinated by the HR and the Commissioner for the ENP, and 
supported by the EEAS. The national leaders had taken crucial decisions on the scope and 
preferred outcome of the negotiations process but had let EU oﬃcials take the lead. Yet, 
as soon as the situation got out of control and Russia came onto the stage as a part of the 
geopolitical conflict, leadership was taken over by member states representatives. It was 
Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande, and later on their foreign ministers Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier and Laurent Fabius, who negotiated on behalf of the EU, and not the High 
Representativenor the President of the European Council. Brussels foreign policy leaders 
were entirely pushed aside by strong national leaders.43 This demonstrates the reluctant 
position of Germany to burden-share with EEAS in high-priority areas. The relations with 
Russia are certainly crucial to Germany and, therefore, Berlin prefers to control EU policy 
towards Moscow.
Poland
Before examining the attitudes of the Polish diplomacy towards the External Action 
Service, it is worth mentioning that the domestic debate on what the establishment of 
the new actor actually means, both for European foreign policy and national diplomacy, 
is largely not that advanced as it is in the case of Germany or the United Kingdom. The 
crucial issue which gained the attention of Polish policy makers and experts was the 
question of geographical balance in the recruitment process for the Service, as Poles were 
41  Adebahr 2013, 14−15; Interview with an oﬃcial from the German Ministry for Foreign Aﬀairs, 
March 2015.
42 Adebahr 2013, 17−18.
43  Interview with a former senior oﬃcial from the German Ministry for Foreign Aﬀairs, March 
2015. 
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strongly underrepresented, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the creation of the 
EEAS. Furthermore, cooperation with European diplomacy was an issue in the context of 
the Polish Presidency of the Council in 2011. Apart from that, the new diplomatic Service 
has rarely been mentioned in the Polish MFA´s documents from 2010 onwards. In March 
2012, a strategic outline with Polish Foreign Policy Priorities for 2012−2016was published 
and the EEAS was labelled as an “appropriate instrument” at the EU´s disposal, which 
“serves the purpose of ensuring more eﬀective coordination of the EU´s external action.”44
In general terms, Poland supported the idea of a common diplomatic service from the 
beginning, and perceived the institutionalisation of diplomacy at the Brussels level as 
an added value to their own national diplomacy.45 Aware of the limitations and rather 
provincial character of the Polish foreign policy in terms of its strong focus on regional 
and transatlantic directions, Warsaw sees the External Service as a power multiplier 
of the Polish voice in the world, and tries to upload its national foreign goals into EU 
policy.46 According to MFA staﬀ, Poland has been particularly interested in bringing its 
ideas regarding the Eastern dimension European Neighbourhood Policy to the European 
level, and in gaining support from other member states. The successful uploading of 
Polish initiatives changes the ideas from local to European ones. One fruitful example 
was the Polish initiative of European Endowment for Democracy. Polish leaders managed 
to win over EEAS oﬃcials to its idea and, in spite of the initial opposition from Berlin 
and other national capitals, the project has been implemented.47Regarding the readiness 
of equipping the newcomer with stronger competences, according to a study conducted 
in 2012, Polish diplomats expressed the opinion that Warsaw would be ready to pass 
additional competences to the EEAS. For instance, there is strong support in Poland for 
the proposal of establishing common embassies with other EU member states. So far, 
there is a Visegrad house in Cape Town, in South Africa, which is used by diplomats from 
the four Visegrad countries, but Warsaw would be open to further similar cooperative 
ventures.48 However, the clincher in terms of the further shift of competences towards 
Brussels and its scale would be the feeling that Poland is strongly represented at the 
top management level of the Service. With the departure of Maciej Popowski from the 
position of deputy Secretary General at the EEAS, the situation looks ever more critical.
Furthermore, as Poland clearly benefits from a stronger EEAS, the former Foreign 
Minister Radoslaw Sikorski’s signature accompanied his German counterpart’s in both 
of the letters the mentioned above from 2011 and 2013. Additionally, in 2013 Sikorski 
joined Italy, Spain and Sweden in supporting a strategic framework for EU foreign policy 
− “We have created a new European External Action Service to serve the overall EU 
44 Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012, 12.
45 See i.e. Sus 2015.
46  Interview with a senior oﬃcial from the Polish Foreign Ministry, October 2014. 
47  Interview with an oﬃcial from the Polish Foreign Ministry, May 2014; Richter and Leininger 
2012.
48 Gromadzki 2013, 66.
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interest abroad, eﬀectively underpinning our role as a global player”.49What is interesting 
in this context is the view of interlocutors from the Polish Foreign Ministry who see 
the public proposals, towards HR and EEAS, as channels to influence the agenda of the 
High Representative.50 In opposition to its German colleagues, the Polish oﬃcials do not 
find the agenda of the Foreign Aﬀairs Council a promising way of promoting national 
interests, since the decision-making process was uploaded rather to the summits of the 
European Council.51 In turn the representatives of Poland strongly agrees on having a key 
asset in terms of Polish personnel in the EEAS structure. The Polish MFA has tried hard to 
promote its oﬃcials to senior and junior positions in the Service, in order to enhance the 
communication between Warsaw and Brussels. However, without a visible success so far.
With regards to the limitations in the relationship between the Polish diplomacy and the 
EEAS, there is a lot of ambiguity about how to preserve the strong national diplomacy 
towards the countries in Eastern Europe and, at the same time, how to gain a stronger 
position through the support of the other EU member states. Poland has not found a way-
out of this impasse yet, however, as the recent Ukraine-Russia crisis has shown, the only 
way to influence Russia is to act in a coherent way (i.e. through sanctions). This is why 
Warsaw would be ready to be represented by the High Representative at the negotiations 
table with Kiev and Moscow, as long as Polish interests are recognised.
Great Britain
The British government was actively engaged in the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty 
in terms of establishing the EEAS, and succeeded in its promotion of Catherine Ashton 
to the position of High Representative but, at the same time, the British government 
constantly emphasised that the new Service was nothing more than a complementary 
body to national foreign oﬃces.’52
After four years of a functioning Service, the following statement by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Oﬃce (FCO) expressed exactly the same opinion: “We will remain 
vigilant against any threat of competence creep on the part of the EEAS”.53
Apparently the question of the relationship between the British foreign ministry and the 
EEAS has been a sensitive issue for over a decade. It has been the subject of vivid debate 
among oﬃcials of the British government, Members of Parliament, and the academic 
world. In 2012−2013 the Foreign Secretary launched the Balance of Competence Review 
49 Bonino, Emma; Sikorski, Radoslaw; García-Margallo y Marfil, Jose Manuel and Bildt Carl.2013. 
“In search of a global strategy”. The European Voice, July 4. 
50  Interview with a senior oﬃcial from the Polish Foreign Ministry, October 2014.
51 Ibid.
52 For more see: Edwards 2013. 
53 Explanatory Memorandum 2013.
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in Parliament, which aimed to explore the state of competence between the EU and the 
UK in foreign policy, and to check whether the existing arrangements are in Britain’s 
national interest54The executive summary of the findings points to the existence of 
“comparative disadvantages of operating through the EU”.55 These are challenges in 
formulating strong, clear strategies, uneven leadership, institutional divisions, slow and 
ineﬀective decision-making processes due to the complicated internal relationships, and 
diﬀering interests. Against this backdrop, the review emphasises British power and their 
ability to act internationally, and calls the EU to “reform its external action” in order to be 
more eﬀective.56
In terms of patterns of cooperation, the UK supports the EEAS in areas where it sees added 
value to its own policy, i.e. sanctions, civilian crisis management, or pursuing long-term 
solutions to political problems, as it is the case of the Middle East Peace Process.57In other 
words, Great Britain is willing to cooperate and to back-up the newcomer in Brussels, 
as long as the European diplomatic Service can contribute to the stronger promotion of 
British international interests and its leverage towards partners. In order to make that 
happen there has to be an agreement over common values that are shared by the UK and 
by other member states. London has no interest to be represented by the EEAS due to the 
size and scope of the Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce.
In terms of influencing the European foreign policy agenda, the strong representation 
of British oﬃcials within the EEAS provides London with an excellent and intensely 
used channel for communication and promotion of national interest and foreign policy 
priorities.58
There are several obstacles in the relationship between FCO and the EEAS. First of all, 
the attitude towards the EEAS seems to have become a part of the Eurosceptic movement 
in Great Britain. In June 2015, the Telegraph published an article titled “The EU is 
stealing Britain’s diplomatic influence – and so we must leave,”59 arguing that European 
diplomacy downplays the British one and it contradicts national interests. Furthermore, 
the article was followed by a short public opinion survey with a question as to whether 
the EU should have its own diplomatic corps or not. Only 14 percent readers answered 
positively,whereas86 percent responded negatively and considered it as overstepping the 
authority of the EU.60 Moreover, Great Britain has been particularly unwilling to see the 
54  Foreign policy has been one of many aspects of the review, since the British government decided 
to review all aspects of its EU membership: Review of the Balance of Competences. Foreign Policy 
Report 2013.
55 Ibid., 6.
56 Ibid., 7.
57  Interview with former senior oﬃcial from FCO, March 2015. 
58  Interview with an oﬃcial from FCO, June 2015.
59 The Telegraph 2015.
60 Ibid.
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EEAS representing the EU in international forums. During the negotiations of the Lisbon 
Treaty, London insisted on underlining the existing responsibilities of the member states 
for representation in international organisations.61 They were eventually provided with 
reassurance in Declaration 13 to the Treaty, according to which the establishment of the 
Service should not “aﬀect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently 
existed, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policies nor of their national 
representation in third countries and international organisations.”62The British position 
became evident in 2011, when the UK mission to the United Nations blocked a substantial 
number of European statements to UN committees because it insisted that the statements 
should be made on behalf of the EU and the member states and not on behalf on the 
EU alone.63For London, the EU is only one of its several networks of influence in the 
international arena. This fact diﬀers the British position from the attitudes of every other 
EU countries (perhaps with the exception of France who is also a permanent member of 
the United Nations Security Council).
Conclusions
Since the European External Action Service may potentially bring a revolution to the 
nation-state diplomacy, it is essential to reflect on its role and relationship with national 
foreign oﬃces’. Moreover, the investigation of the relationships between member states 
and the EEAS will shed some light into their role within the EU as an international actor, 
and their visions of what the Union should potentially achieve in the international arena. 
Since, in foreseeable future, EU member states will remain key stakeholders in this field, it 
is important to examine where national capitals see opportunity for common approaches, 
what the issues are that must be left to the member states and how the inevitable division 
of labour between national diplomacies and EU-level diplomacy should be.
As the secase studies have proven, all three countries, although diﬀering in degree seem to 
have an ambiguous position towards the newcomer. On the one hand, they support stronger 
EU foreign policy coordinated from Brussels, not only in terms of rhetoric but also as a way to 
enhance their own foreign policy objectives. On the other, they are aware of the fact that the 
further development of the External Action Service could undermine the international role 
of national foreign oﬃces ’by limiting their space to act. Not surprisingly, there is a common 
opinion in all three countries that the Service should remain complementary to national 
foreign services. Yet, the readiness to share national competences with Brussels diplomacy 
diﬀers significantly among the three examined cases. While Germany and Poland seem to be 
open to the strengthening of the role of the newcomer(albeit for diﬀerent reasons), the both 
see the Service as a promoter of their national interest, Great Britain remains resistant and 
61 Miller and Taylor 2008, 62−64.
62  Declaration 13. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union 2008.
63 Carta and Whitman 2013, 146−146.
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is openly against any shift of competences from the national diplomacy towards Brussels. 
As Simon Duke put it: “the apparent unwillingness of some of the Member States to see the 
EEAS emerge as a strategic actor in its own right is (…) a potential brake on any meaningful 
strategic direction”.64
The member states and the newcomer seem to be trapped in a vicious circle. National 
leaders keep complaining that the EEAS does not fulfil its mandate in terms of bringing 
coherence over the various foreign policy instruments, and coordination of external action. 
The answer from Brussels is, however, that the member states are unwilling to share their 
competences and restrain the role of the newcomer. With this view in mind, one can 
conclude that, for a turn towards a collective European diplomacy to be possible, member 
states have to go beyond the notion of complementarity in their relationships with the EEAS, 
and explore diﬀerent modes of parallel functioning. At the same time, the Service and the 
High Representative, as its head, have to find a niche and prove their ability to bring added 
value to EU foreign policy. The on-going process of drafting the new EU Global Strategy for 
Foreign and Security Policy has chances to become such a stress test.65Of course, it would 
be a mistake to expect that the new EU Global Strategy, as an outcome of the on-going 
review process, will be a remedy for all ills of EU´s foreign policy. However, if Federica 
Mogherini, the successor to Ashton, manages to make an assessment of the member states´ 
divergent interests and to accommodate those by developing a comprehensive picture of 
European global priorities, courses of actions and instruments, it may be a step forward to 
the strategic orientation of a bolder and more active EU foreign policy.
Furthermore, by pointing out diﬀerences in the patterns of cooperation between the three 
national diplomatic approaches analysed and the EEAS, this paper draws attention to 
the still vague definition of the strategic role and political functions that the new Service 
should play in EU foreign policy. As van Veen, an expert from the Clingendael Institute, 
rightly noticed, the current debate concerning the functioning of the European diplomatic 
service is so procedural that it barely touches on what its strategic purpose should 
be.66Taking this into account, the systematic examination of the relationship between 
the member states (n>3) and the new Service seems to be indispensable in order to find 
further reasons and subsequently solutions to the entrapment of rhetorical support but 
limited will to share competences. For such research, the analytical framework has to be 
further developed (e.g. by operationalisation of the new intergovernmentalism approach) 
and the empirical material should be extended (primarily via interviews with national 
diplomats and EEAS oﬃcials).By shedding light on the diverse picture of how the member 
states and the European diplomacy have interplayed within the last five years, this paper 
has attempted to contribute to further research in this field.
64 Duke 2014, 30.
65  See i.e. Sus and Pfeifer 2015.
66  Van Veen 2014.
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